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continue to privilege the legal rights of the accused and to reinforce a liberal legalistic construction of
sexual violence. Privacy, posed as a "right" to contain narratives of sexualized violence within a bounded
personal space, may provide but tenuous protection against vigorous pursuit of records by defence
counsel. When complainants can be constructed as failing to enact the characteristics of ideal
victimhood, their entitlement to privacy is discounted. Through a discursive analysis of the case law on
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THE IDEAL VICTIM, THE
HYSTERICAL COMPLAINANT, AND
THE DISCLOSURE OF
CONFIDENTIAL RECORDS: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHARTER
FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW©
BY LISE GOTELL"

This article explores the current state of Canadian
law on the production and disclosure of complainants'
records to reflect upon the implications of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms for Canadian sexual
assault law and jurisprudence. Some scholars assert that
the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Mills, upholding
section 278 of the Criminal Code governing access to
complainants' records, constitutes an erosion of
accuseds' rights and an unjustified compromise of
constitutional standards. By contrast, this article
demonstrates that R. v. Mills is a highly contradictory
decision that can be read as creating an interpretation of
section 278 that privileges defendants' rights and
undermines the protections that the legislative regime
sought to erect. Emerging out of the tensions inscribed
within Mills, recent decisions continue to privilege the
legal rights of the accused and to reinforce a liberal
legalistic construction of sexual violence. Privacy, posed
as a "right" to contain narratives of sexualized violence
within a bounded personal space, may provide but
tenuous protection against vigorous pursuit of records by
defence counsel. When complainants can be constructed
as failing to enact the characteristics of ideal victimhood,
their entitlement to privacy is discounted. Through a
discursive analysis of the case law on access to
complainants' records, the article contends that the
mechanism of disclosure constitutes the central
contemporary enactment of the hysterization of the rape
victim.

Cet article examine le droit canadien vis-A-vis la
communication de dossiers dans les poursuites relatives
hune infraction d'ordre sexuel et offre une r~flexion sur
les r~percussions de la Charte canadiennedesdroitsetdes
libert~s sur la loi et la jurisprudence en matire
d'agression sexuelle. Certains auteurs affirment que la
ratio dans Ia decision R. c. Mills de la Coursuprlme du
Canada constitue une 6rosion des droits de I'accus6 tout
en compromettant de faqon inacceptable les standards
constitutionnels. Toutefois, l'auteure maintient que la
d6cision R. c. Mills est contradictoire puisque ['article
278 peut diminuer les protections que le r6gime l6gislatif
tente d'offrir, tout en favorisant les d~fendeurs. En
raison des tensions caus~es parR. c. Mills, les decisions
plus r~centes continuent Afavoriser les droits de I'accus6
et de renforcer une id6ologie juridique librale de la
violence sexuelle. Le droit i ]a vie prive, sous guise d'un
droit A renfermer la violence sexuelle clans un espace
personnel d~limit6, n'offre qu'une protection alhatoire
vis-A-vis des efforts vigoureux des avocats de d6fense qui
tentent de se procurer les dossiers des appelants. Quand
les appelants ne d~montrent pas les caract~ristiques
typiques de la victimisation, leurs droits A la vie priv(e
peuvent atre injustement accord6s peu de valeur. Par
l'entremise d'une analyse explicative de lajurisprudence
relative au droit d'accas aux dossier des appelants, cet
article maintient que le mecanisme de communication de
dossiers promouvoit le concept contemporain de la
victime hyst6rique d'agression sexuelle.
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It is by eliciting confessions in the courtroom, then allowing certain things to count as
reasonable and certain things to count as unjust, that law functions as a form of
power/knowledge. But rape law only allows certain kinds of stories to count as rapes .... The
legal process structures the violence of rape not only by retrospectively identifying certain
acts as violent and others as "normal"; it also forces women to redefine what was
"significant" about their experience in order to testify successfully, and often enhances the
sense of violation and self-doubt begun by the physical rape.)

The very possibility that a sexual assault complainant's personal

records could be disclosed to the accused creates a new vulnerability for all
of those seeking legal redress for sexual violation. A complainant's story
must meet high standards of consistency and coherence to resist new
techniques of credibility probing used to seek access to confidential records.
This article will explore the current state of Canadian law concerning

production and disclosure in the context of sexual assault trials. This case
Laura Hengehold, "An Immodest Proposal: Foucault, Hysterization, and the 'Second Rape'
(1994) 9 Hypatia 88 at 95 [Hengehold, "Immodest"].
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study will reflect upon the implications of the Canadian Charterof Rights
and Freedoms2 for Canadian sexual assault law and jurisprudence.

The quest for access to complainants' records is a key feature of
post-Charter sexual assault law. In 1992, after the Supreme Court of Canada
struck the rape shield law,3 the federal government re-enacted restrictions
on sexual history evidence-albeit in a weakened form-in accordance with
the majority's insistence on scope for judicial discretion.' In R. v. Darrach,'
these restrictions were upheld against a legal rights challenge. The 1992
reform also enacted a statutory definition of consent as voluntary
agreement, 6 enumerated situations of forced submission that do not
constitute consent,7 limited the defence of mistaken belief in consent, as
well as requiring that the accused take "reasonable steps" to ensure
consent.' In R. v. Ewanchuk,9 the Supreme Court elaborated on the
2 Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c.
11 [Charter].
R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R.
577.
4 See Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 276 [Criminal Code]. This section prohibits the
admission of sexual history evidence solely for the purpose of showing that the complainant was more
likely to have consented or is less worthy of belief. It also requires that the evidence must be relevant
to an issue to be proved at trial and that it must have significant probative value that is not "outweighed
by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice." It further mandates that in
determining relevance and probative value, the judge must consider such factors as: the accused's right
to make full answer and defence; society's interest in the reporting of crime; the importance of
eliminating any discriminatory belief or bias from the fact-finding process; the risk that the evidence will
arouse the jury's sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility; the possible prejudice to the
complainant's privacy and dignity; and the right of all persons to personal security and to protection and
benefit of the law.
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 443. For a feminist commentary, see Janine Benedet, "Legal
Rights in the
Supreme Court of Canada in 2000: Seeing the 'Big Picture' (2001) 14 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 97. -,
6 Consent is defined as "the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual
activity in question": see Criminal Code,supra note 4, s. 273.1(1).
7 Criminal Code, supra note 4, s. 273.1(2):
(2) Where no consent obtained - No consent is obtained, for the purposes of sections 271,272 and
273, where
(a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the complainant;
(b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity;
(c) the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust,
power or authority;
(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the activity;
or
(e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses by words or conduct,
a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity.
8 CriminalCode, supra note 4, s. 273.2:
It is not a defence to a charge under section 271, 272 or 273 that the accused believed that the
complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, where
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meaning of consent, ruled against the defence of implied consent supported
by the lower court, and emphasized that the "reasonable steps" analysis is
a central part of the test for mistaken belief. These statutory provisions, as
well as their recent interpretation by the Court, appear to indicate a new
era in the constitutional interpretation of sexual assault: one in which there
is greater respect for the dignity of complainants, as well as a much firmer
judicial recognition of the feminist-inspired insistence that "no means no."
Nevertheless, as Susan Estrich has cogently argued, the ironic consequence
of greater legal appreciation of culpability for sexual aggression has been
a heightened focus by the defence on destroying the credibility of
complainants:
Precisely because it is all but impossible these days to argue successfully that no means yes,
or that men are privileged to have sex with crying women, or that even stupidity as to consent
should serve as a defence, men charged with rape, and those who defend them, have few
options but to argue the incredibility of the woman victim.'

Probing complainants' private records for evidence of inconsistency
in order to create the appearance of faulty memories and motives to lie has
provided the key mechanism of attacking complainants in Canada since the
1990s. This tactic functions as a kind of end run around legislative barriers
to sexual history evidence and statutory restrictions on the defence of
mistaken belief."
While the quest for access to records has assumed an elevated
importance during the post-Charterera, it is also an area of sexual assault
law that exemplifies some of the critical implications of a constitutional
rights regime for dealing with the problem of sexualized coercion. These
implications include the legal privileging of defendants' rights, the erosion
of protections for complainants, and the complex dance between the
legislatures and the courts-set within a discursive context where rights
claims obscure the complexities of sexualized violence. I will argue that
(a) the accused's belief arose from the accused's
(i) self-induced intoxication, or
(ii) recklessness or wilful blindness; or
(b) the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the
time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting.
9119991 1 S.C.R. 330. See Renu Mandhane, "Efficiency or Autonomy?: Economic
and Feminist
Legal Theory in the Context of Sexual Assault" (2001) 2 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 173.
Susan Estrich, "Palm Beach Stories" (1992) 11 Law & Phil. 5 at 14.
Karen Busby, "Discriminatory Uses of Personal Records in Sexual Violence Cases"
(1997) 9
C.J.W.L. 148. See also Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) Submissions to the Standing
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs Review of Bill C-46 (1997) at 11.
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through an analysis of production and disclosure we can observe the
enhanced sway of a liberal legalistic discourse of rape; one in which a social
and political analysis of sexual violence is being displaced.
I.

ACCESS TO COMPLAINANTS' RECORDS: OVERVIEW
AND ARGUMENTS

In 1999, the Supreme Court decided R. v. Mills,12 a case that
considered a constitutional challenge to the federal government's legislative
scheme governing access to sexual assault complainants' confidential
records. Bill C-4613 sought to restrict access to private records and to ensure
that the defendants' legal rights were balanced against the equality and
privacy rights of complainants. Emerging out of a series of consultations
with women's groups, anti-rape activists, and defence counsel, Bill C-46
added section 278 to the Criminal Code. Section 278 made a number of
rationales for disclosure insufficient and gave judges guidance on the kinds
of factors to consider in applications, including complainants' equality
rights and society's interest in reporting sexual assault. Welcomed by
feminist law reformers and condemned by defence counsel, this legislation
was intended to replace the common law test for disclosure
established by
4
the Supreme Court in 1995 with R. v. O'Connor.1
In upholding section 278 in its entirety, the Mills decision, with
eight judges in the majority and one in dissent, could be viewed as a
feminist legal victory. But the Mills decision is riddled with ambiguities,
giving rise to a situation in which complainants remain vulnerable to
disclosure, albeit in different ways than under the O'Connorregime. There
has been a great deal of debate about the meaning of Mills, with many legal
analysts suggesting that the decision erodes the accused's legal rights and
compromises constitutional standards to the supremacy of parliament.15 In
part, this article engages with this debate. I argue that the decision itself is
contradictory. On the one hand, Mills gestures to complainants' rights and
establishes a threshold test for production that would seem to work against
speculative defence requests. On the other hand, however, the decision can
be read as creating an interpretation of section 278 that privileges
12 [19991 3 S.C.R. 668 [Mills].
13 Bill C-46, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (production of
records in sexual offence

proceedings), 2d Sess., 3 5 'hPan. 1997 (assented to 25 April 1997), S.C. 1997, c. 30 [Bill C-46].
14 [1995]
4 S.C.R. 411 [O'Connor].
See Jamie Cameron, "Dialogue and Hierarchy in CharterInterpretation: A Comment on
R. v.
Mills" (2001) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 1051 at 1051.
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defendants' rights and undermines the protections that the legislative
regime sough to erect."
The meaning of Mills, however, cannot be settled through an
interrogation of the decision and an analysis of Bill C-46. A narrow
doctrinal focus on Supreme Court decisions is a troubling feature of much
Charter scholarship in the area of sexual assault law.17 This article will
attempt to go beyond the speculation that is often a feature of Supreme
Court-centred approaches by examining how the Mills decision has
influenced lower court interpretations. This is the context in which the
disclosure regime is applied and given meaning. It is also where the
consequences of Mills' ambiguous balancing of defendants' and
complainants' rights has been given divergent interpretations, impacting in
concrete ways on women and children who bring forward sexual assault
complaints. The impact of the decision, in the end, depends on the
strategies adopted by defence counsel in relation to the judicially
elaborated test for access, the interpretations given to this test by trial and
appellate judges, and the manner in which this area of law has worked to
discursively construct the "good rape victim" in a new guise.
This article examines the post-Mills case law on access to
complainants' records. In all, I have examined thirty-seven trial and
appellate decisions concerning access to complainants' private records (see
Appendix A). Upon comparison with complainants' experiences under the
O'Connortest, recent case law suggests a reduced likelihood of production
and disclosure, flowing from Mills' insistence on an evidentiary basis for
defence assertions of the likely relevance of confidential records.
Nevertheless, very often woven through the courts' refusals to grant access
to complainants' records are narrow and highly individualistic analyses of
the potential consequences of records disclosure. Focused almost
myopically on privacy rights, this framing denies the structural and systemic
nature of sexual violence, containing women's words about their
experiences within a rigidly demarcated and depoliticized personal space.
Decisions to intrude upon this personal space seem to hinge upon memory,
upon assertions about the disordered and hysterical character of
complainants, and upon the almost ubiquitous defence claim that women's
and children's stories of assault have been suggested and manipulated.
These decisions are grounded in and legitimized by a conception of fair trial
16 See Steve Coughlan, "Complainants' Records After Mills: Same As it Ever Was" (2000) 33
Const. Rev. (5th) 300. See also Lise Gotell, "Colonization Through Disclosure: Confidential Records,
Sexual Assault Complainants and Canadian Law" (2001) 10 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 315.
Karen Busby's study of the pre-Mills case law is an important exception. See Karien
Busby,
"Third Party Records Cases Since R. v. O'Connor"(2000) 27 Man. L.J. 355.
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rights that gives wide scope for rigorous credibility testing of complainants.
The post-Charterdiscourse of fair trial rights empowers new and multiple
assertions about the inherently suspect claims of the sexual assault victim.
The result is to depict the sexual assault complainant as the irrational,
incredible, and hysterical other of the rational legal subject. This article
demonstrates that complainants remain vulnerable to disclosure post-Mills
and that the battle over confidential records remains a critical site of
struggle in sexual assault law.
II.

LIBERAL LEGALISM AND SEXUAL ASSAULT

The predominant understanding of sexual violence is framed in the
shadow of legal discourse, a discourse that derives its legitimation from its
own self-privileging as the arbiter of "truth" and the simultaneous negation
of oppositional discourses."8 The legal discourse of rape is based upon rigid
binaries: consent/coercion, rape/normal heterosex, rational/irrational, and
guilty/innocent. Through this binary logic, rape is defined against "normal
heterosex." Women's and children's claims are often rendered
incomprehensible and the dynamics of coercive sexuality are obscured. The
Canadian experience of records disclosure reveals a critical mechanism by
which claims of sexual coercion have been disqualified. Dissonant
narratives have been subordinated to the "tyranny of the binary" through
records disclosure.' 9 In turn, the productive possibilities for creating
heterogeneous "alternative" knowledges outside the straightjacket of liberal
legalism are eclipsed as the trial becomes the central metaphor for
acknowledging sexual violation.
This article explores the rape trial and the specific dynamics of
records disclosure from a Foucauldian perspective, as a disciplinary matrix
with constitutive effects. As Michel Foucault emphasized, the repressive
and coercive functions of law need to be downplayed in favour of an
analysis of law's constructive functions as discipline, surveillance, and
normalization.20 This approach is one that highlights the discursive effects
of sexual assault law-the criteria by which authoritative pronouncements
are separated from "hysteria"-and, in this process, gendered subjectivities,
18 Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (New York: Routledge, 1989) at 11.
19 This is Anne Edwards' concept. See Anne Edwards, "Gender and Sexuality in the
Social
Construction of Rape and Consensual Sex: A Study of Process and Outcome in Six Recent Rape Trials"
in Janet Holland & Lisa Adkins, eds., Sex Sensibility and the Gendered Body (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1996) at 178.
20 Annie Bunting, "Feminism, Foucault, and Law as Power/Knowledge" (1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev.
829 at 838.
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adequate rationality, and definitions of violence are created and
reinforced.21 It is not simply that the penetration of complainants' records
is based upon rape myths; for example, the mendacious woman and the
deluded complainant. It is instead that the mechanism of disclosure and the
cases in this area of law actively work to demarcate the category of the
"good rape victim," replete with scripted expectations about what she will
and will not do, just as they work to construct the very meaning of sexual
assault.
In many ways, the sexual assault trial represents a central act in
what Judith Butler refers to as the performativity of gender.22 Through it,
we can observe the endless repetition of heteronormativity's key scripts: the
assertion and reassertion of an active, uncontrollable male sexuality and a
passive female sexuality; the incredibility of sexual coercion; and the
construction of women (and children) as more emotional, less rational, and
less reliable than men. 23 In contrast to the feminist insistence on the
structural and systemic nature of sexual coercion, the liberal legalistic
construction is premised on a conception of rape as a discrete and isolated
incident-as a violent sexual incident and a matter of individual deviance.
Constructed as a crime, the "reality" of rape (that is, whether or not a set
of events can properly be called rape) can only be discerned through the
rigorous application of legal method. Through a careful consideration of all
"relevant" evidence and through an adversarial confrontation between the
accused/defence attorney and the crown prosecutor, it is assumed that
judges will be able to arrive at the "truth" of the matter at hand-a
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. This "truth" is empowered by the manner in which law is viewed as
akin to Western science, capable of revealing reality through disciplined,
"objective," and "impartial" consideration of legally relevant facts.
The rape trial, as the stage of this discursive play, takes the form of
an abstracted exercise of logic unrelated to the context of sexual
interactions and to the complainant's own account of her violation.24 The
courtroom scene and the language of law create the image of law as
separating out the "truth" from the hysteria of the victim. Prosecutors and
the defence act as custodians of this order and are resistant to any form of
dialogue that attempts to make sense of the sexual violence that does not
21 Hengehold, "Immodest", supra note 1 at 88, 94.
22 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter (New York: Routledge, 1993) at 12-16.
23 Carol Smart, Law, Crime and Sexuality (London: Sage Publications, 1995) at 84.
24 T. Brettel Dawson, "Sexual Assault Law and the Past Sexual Conduct of the Primary Witness:
The Construction of Relevance" (1986-1988) 2 C.J.W.L. 310 at 316.
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fit legal models of guilt or innocence.2' Kristin Bumiller contends that
survivors' discourse exceeds legal discourse in important ways, reflecting
a non-legal conception of rape that describes feelings of violation and is not
bound to the nature of the act. 6 Sexual violation results in a painful
disruption of bodily integrity and also subjectivity, producing ambiguities
that need to be negotiated and articulated. 27 In law, however, a survivor is
unable to speak from her own terrain: "the ambiguity and uncertainty in her
accounts of violent sexual experiences are appropriated in a field of
language that interprets these responses as self-doubt ...
." The imperatives
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt often demand more than a victim can
provide, requiring perfect consistency in the telling.29 Through
constitutionally entrenched safeguards that ensure that individual citizens
can only be held accountable for actions that fall within clearly demarcated
parameters, legal discourse acts as a metaphorical sieve, straining out
complexity and political and social content from the stories of survivors.3°
As Laura Hengehold contends, the rape trial contributes to the
"hysterization" of women by producing complainants' confessions in order
to demonstrate their lack of self-knowledge. According to Hengehold, the
rape trial "reinforces a discursive formation in which women are made to
appear less coherent than men from whom they are differentiated by their
status as victims."31 The rape trial gives sexual violence a public form, while
at the same time inscribing it within a discourse in which women are forced
to present an inadequate, hysterical subjectivity.
The mechanism of records disclosure is a central contemporary
enactment of this process of hysterization. Estrich, writing in the American
context and Wendy Larcombe, writing in the Australian context, both point
to an escalation in the defence's use of women's counselling and other
records that parallels the Canadian experience.32 As in Canada, this defence
25 Kristin Bumiller, "Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence Against Women
in Legal
Culture" (1990) 18 Int'l J. Soc. L. 125 at 138 [Bumiller, "Fallen"].
26
Kristin Bumiller, "Rape As A Legal Symbol: An Essay on Sexual Violence and Racism" (19871988) 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 75 at 82.
27
Laura Hengehold, "Remapping the Event: Institutional Discourses and the Trauma of Rape"
(2000) 26 Signs 189 at 196 [Hengehold, "Remapping"].
28 Bumiller, "Fallen", supra note 25 at 141.
29 Estrich, supra note 10 at 27-28.
30 Hengehold, "Remapping", supra note 27 at 197.

32

Hengehold, "Immodest", supra note
1at 89.
Estrich, supra note 10 at 17. See also Wendy Larcombe, "The 'Ideal' Victim v. Successful Rape

Complainants: Not What You Might Expect" (2002) 10 Fem. Legal Stud. 131 at 136-37.
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tactic has coincided with the enactment of rape shield laws that close off the
possibilities of discrediting a complainant through the traditional method
of sexualizing her. As law invades the extra-legal settings where women and
children have been able to express their experiences of sexualized violence,
sexual assault complainants have to be prepared to endure an
unprecedented level of scrutiny to secure a conviction.33 In this process,

boundaries of interiority are breached, re-enacting the violation of the
physical rape with an assault on the complainants' subjective sense of self.
As Larcombe insists, this mechanism provides a potent means for
destabilizing and discrediting complainants' claims.34 Like sexual history
evidence, information gathered from records is used to create a distinction
between the complainant and the "ideal victim." If once the ideal victim
was characterized by her chastity and sexual morality, the new ideal victim
is consistent, rational, self-disciplined, and blameless.35 Evidence gained
from records can discredit a complainant's story "by exposing and attaching
adverse inferences to any inconsistency, any undesirable fact, even anything
surprising or unexpected about her," and this is used to orchestrate a gap
between the complainant's claims and the characteristics of the ideal rape
victim.3 6 Through a dissection of case law, we can observe the contours of
this distinction-a distinction that emerges from and is legitimized by the
Charterrights claims mounted by the defence.
THE SHAPING OF BILL C-46

III.

Access to confidential records was not framed as a constitutional
rights claim until the early 1990s when defence counsel began to employ the
Charter'sfair trial guarantees37 as an inviolable rationale for disclosure. In
the Supreme Court's O'Connordecision,38 with five judges in the majority
and four in dissent, credence was lent to these claims; the decision
established a test for production and disclosure that ushered in a period of
33 Larcombe, ibid. at 136.
34 Ibid. at 137.

35 Ibid. at 144.
36

Ibid. at 137.
37 The fair trial guarantees are found in sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter,supra note 2. Section
7 reads, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Subsection 11(d) of
the Charterreads, "Any person charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal."
38 See O'Connor,supra note 14.
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wide open access to complainants' records. As many analysts have argued,
this two-stage test rested on a presumption of the defacto relevance of third
party records.39 At the first stage, the defence must demonstrate the "likely

relevance" defined as "a reasonable possibility that the information is
logically probative to an issue at trial or the competence of a witness to
testify."4 ° Here the Court cautioned that the accused's burden should not
be "onerous"'" and the decision expressly excluded any consideration of
complainants' rights. If the records pass the first stage of production, they
were to be released to the trial judge to determine whether they should be
disclosed to the accused. It is only at this second stage, the majority argued,
that the privacy interests of the complainant and the record holder are to
be considered. The test was skewed in favour of production on the basis of
the accused's right to make full answer and defence. The judge was to weigh
the "salutary and deleterious effects ...
and determine whether a non-

production order would constitute a reasonable
limit on the ability of the
42
accused to make full answer and defence.,
It is now becoming increasingly clear that under the O'Connor
regime, the likely relevance test functioned as a virtual "open door"
through which judges were invited into the realm of the complainants'
personal records. 43 This invasion, in turn, was justified by and rooted in a
conception of fair trial rights by which the accused was viewed as being
constitutionally entitled to all exculpatory evidence. Of thirty-five disclosure
applications made in this period, records were ruled likely relevant in
twenty-four cases.' The very predictability of applications during the period
between the O'Connordecision and Bill C-46, as well as the tendency for
trial judges to release records to the accused (in 60 per cent 45 to 75 per

39

Bruce Feldthusen, "Access to the Private Therapeutic Records of Sexual Assault Complainants"
(1996) 75 Can. Bar Rev. 537 at 551. See also Gotell, supra note 16 at 323.
40 O'Connor,supra note 14 at 436.
41 Ibid. at 437.
42 Ibid. at 441-42.
43According to the Attorney General of Canada, the first stage of the O'Connortest
became an
"as of right" procedure in which it was presumed that records should be made available for in camera
review. Mills, supra note 12 (Factum of the Attorney General of Canada).
44Busby, supra note 17 at 383. See also Mills,supra note 12 (Factum of the Appellant at para.
16).
45 Busby found that in 67 per cent of cases that passed the threshold for production, records or
portions thereof were released to the accused: see Busby, ibid. at 384.

262

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 40, NOS. 3 & 4

cent4 6 of cases during this period), confirms the enduring salience of rape
myths and their power to influence those who have the authority to
determine the legal "truth" of sexual assault. The effect of the O'Connor

decision on the law's processing of sexual violation claims was to radically
shrink the category of who is rapable, just as it expanded the possibilities of
demonstrating consent. Always regarded with suspicion, allegations of
sexual assault became even more suspect as confidential information came
to be used to attack the credibility of complainants. Women, particularly
those most vulnerable to assault, were increasingly cast into the category of
unrapable. Extensively documented women, including women with mental
health histories, immigrant women, aboriginal women, childhood assault
survivors, foster children, and women with disabilities were especially
vulnerable to records applications.47 The release of therapy or psychiatric
files implies that female complainants are inherently unreliable and that the
usual methods for testing credibility are insufficient in sexual assault trials.

Significantly, it was counselling records that were most frequently sought
when disclosure applications were made under O'Connor'sliberal regime
of access.48 There is strong evidence that, during this period, complainants

were faced with an impossible choice-report and do not seek therapy or
do not report.49
It is a mistake to view Bill C-46 as simply a response to the
O'Connordecision. Legislation that would seek to restrict the widespread

use of confidential records in sexual assault trials had begun to take shape
46

A 1998 survey of clients of sexual assault centres reports that women's confidential records were

released in almost 75 per cent of cases in which they were requested. See Tina Hattem, Survey of Sexual
Assault Survivors: Report to Participants(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2000) at 13, online: Canadian
Association of Sexual Assault Centres < http://www.casac.ca/issues/survey.htm >.
47 Marilyn T. MacCrimmon & Christine Boyle, "Equality, Fairness And Relevance:
Disclosure
of Therapists Records in Sexual Assault Trials" in Marilyn T. MacCrimmon & Monique Ouellette, eds.,
Filtering and Analyzing Evidence in an Age of Diversity (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for the
Administration of Justice, 1993) at 81.
48 Hattem, supra note 46 at 12.
49 The Hattem study revealed that concern over the possibility of record disclosure
was a major
reason for not reporting: "women said that they were unwilling to risk being re-victimized by 'being put
under a microscope during the trial'... ": ibid. at 10. The Attorney General of Canada, the Appellant,
and several interveners in Mills also provided evidence for this claim in their submissions to the
Supreme Court. Supra note 43 at para. 21; Mills, supra note 44 at paras.126-29; Mills, supra note 12
(Factum of the Canadian Mental Health Association and Factum of the LEAF). Finally, in a study
undertaken by doctors working at the Sexual Assault Service at Vancouver General Hospital it is
reported that the rate of police reporting declined steadily between 1993 and 1997. While the authors
make no link between this decline and the escalation of successful disclosure requests, the coincidence
is suggestive. See Margaret MacGregor et al., "Why Don't More Women Report Sexual Assault to the
Police?" (2000) 162 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 659.
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in the federal Department of Justice long before the release of the Supreme
Court's decision. In a series of consultations beginning in 1994, crisis
workers and anti-violence activists brought the issue to the attention of the
federal government and elaborated on the significant negative implications
this practice had on their ability to act as effective advocates of sexually
assaulted women and children. 0 Activists cited countless examples of
centers overrun by subpoenas for records (one center faced forty
subpoenas) with legal fees eating up their restricted budgets and workers
forced to spend their days in the halls of courthouses, rather than helping
assaulted women.5 Based on the claim that records applications always
introduce rape myths into legal deliberations and, therefore, cannot be in
the interests of justice, the position that was consistently put forward in
these consultations was "no records, no time." Activists demanded that the
government act immediately to address a crisis situation by legislating the
irrelevance and statutory privilege of confidential records.
In Mills, the Supreme Court used the fact of consultations as
support for the decision to uphold legislation that departed from the
O'Connor regime, arguing that "it was open to Parliament to give what
weight it saw fit to the evidence presented at the consultations. 5 2 Jamie
Cameron, in her critique of the decision, argues that the mere presence of
consultation should not be allowed to save a "clear" breach of the legal
rights provisions of Charter.53 But she grounds this argument in
misrepresentation: Cameron constructs the consultation process that led to
the introduction of Bill C-46 as narrow, slanted in favour of anti-rape
activists, and confined to the legislative process directly preceding the bill.54
This picture of the federal government as somehow "captured" by feminist
advocates quite simply ignores the record. In a sense, Bill C-46 can be
viewed as a governmental response to feminist lobbying. Yet once the
federal Department of Justice had committed itself to addressing the issue,
it undertook ten separate consultations over a fourteen-month period, that
included crisis workers, anti-rape activists, crown attorneys, defence
50 Department of Justice, Consultation: Access to Complainant's Records (Summary of
Consultations) (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1996) at 1 [Department of Justice, "Access"]. This
document provides a summary of all consultations that had taken place on access to confidential
records.
51 Department of Justice, Consultation on Violence Against Women (Ottawa: Department
of
Justice, 1995) at 51-69 [Department of Justice, "Violence"].
52
Mills, supra note 12 at 745.
Supra note 15 at 1061-62.
54

Ibid.
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lawyers, and academics.5
While Canadian feminist groups and service providers have been
among the legislation's strongest defenders, it is crucial to recognize that
any regime for disclosure represented a departure from the preferred
instrument of statutory privilege. Moreover, the agenda of feminist and
anti-rape groups in the consultations had extended far beyond criminal law
reform and enhanced protections for complainants. During successive
meetings, activists embraced a coherent and agreed-upon position to frame
their demands; this position is articulated in the document 99 FederalSteps
to End Violence Against Women.56 This agenda contested the narrow focus
on the criminal justice system, framed sexualized coercion as a systemic
problem rooted in gendered and racialized inequalities, and demanded
state action on a number of fronts-including social policy, public
education, and, crucially, the provision of a stable funding base for
independent, women-controlled front line work. In reading the transcripts
of these consultations, one is immediately struck by how cabinet ministers
and their officials sought to channel this broad agenda into a much
narrower emphasis on criminal law reform." Moreover, initiatives in
criminal law reform, and, in particular, the federal government's efforts to
respond to the chaos surrounding defence requests for confidential records,
were consistently framed as being strictly bound by what the legal rights
provisions of the Charter could and could not allow. In this way, as
predicted by critics such as Judy Fudge in the late 1980s, the politics and
discourse of the Charter is not confined to the courts but invades the
legislative forum. As she argued in an early analysis of the implications of
the Charterfor sexual violence, rather than focusing on how best to respond
to the pervasive problem of sexualized coercion, political debate is
increasingly cast in terms of competing constitutional rights. In this58way,
"inconvenient demands" can be swept away by invoking the Charter.
55 Department of Justice, "Access", supra note 50
at 1-2.
56 Canadian Association of Sexual Assault Centres, 99 FederalSteps to End to Violence Against
Women (Ontario: National Action Committee on the Status of Women, 1993), online: Canadian
Association of Sexual Assault Centres Homepage <http:/www.casac.ca/99steps/99steps.htm>.
57 This was evident in the 1995 Violence Against Women consultation when Sheila Finestone,
Minister for the Status of Women, stated that funding cuts to anti-violence work and social programs
were the result of neo-liberal imperatives and the International Monetary Fund. Quickly following this
comment, which was resisted and debated by activists who insisted that ending violence against women
meant addressing women's equality, Department of Justice officials and cabinet ministers sought to
return the discussion to safer ground, drafting legislation to address sexual assault complainants'
records. See Department of Justice, "Violence", supra note 51 at 26.
58 Judy Fudge, "The Effect of Entrenching a Bill of Rights upon Political Discourse: Feminist
Demands and Sexual Violence in Canada" (1989) 17 Int'l. J. Soc. L. 445 at 459.
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The introduction of Bill C-46 was perfectly consistent with
governmental efforts to address the complex problem of coercive sexuality
and gender violence through the criminal justice system, -while
simultaneously avoiding concrete and empowering social policy responses.
Over the past decade and a half, the Canadian women's movement has
come to loggerheads with governments intent on dismantling the vestiges
of the welfare state; yet legislative initiatives designed to combat violence
against women have proliferated during this very same period.5 9 In response
to successive court decisions that have undermined protections for
complainants in sexual assault trials, recent federal governments have
undertaken a series of "progressive" sexual assault law reforms, of which
Bill C-46 is the most recent example. It may be tempting to interpret this
exchange between courts and legislatures as the dance of "progressive"
politics versus "regressive" liberal legalism or as Cameron does, as evidence
of feminist political influence.6 °Yet, as I have emphasized elsewhere, while
appreciating the laudable stated objectives of these criminal law reforms,
it is at the same time crucially important to pay attention to their form and
underlying thrust. Feminist claims regarding the structural and systemic
character of sexual violence have been filtered through a discourse
emphasizing criminal responsibility and retribution.6"
It is clear that Bill C-46 did represent a considered legislative effort
to forestall the routine legal invasions of complainants' private records that
had become common under the O'Connor regime. In this sense, the bill
could be seen as a kind of prophylactic, seeking to reduce (but not
eliminate) disclosure, through a mechanism that balanced the accused's
legal rights against the complainant's equality and privacy rights and
societal concerns. In a number of ways, the Criminal Code revisions
resulting from this legislative reform significantly altered the common law
regime established by the Supreme Court in O'Connor.
Bill C-46 defined the scope of records subject to its strict procedures
extremely broadly as "any form of record that contains personal
information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy."62 By
Lise Gotell, "A Critical Look at State Discourse on 'Violence against Women':
Some
Implications for Feminist Politics and Women's Citizenship" in Manon Tremblay & Caroline Andrew,
eds., Women and Political Representation in Canada (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1998) at 39
[Gotell, "State Discourse"].
60 Cameron, supra note 15 at 1063.
61 Gotell, "State Discourse", supra note 59.
62 Criminal Code, supra note 4. Section 278.1 lists protected records:

" .

without limiting the

generality of the foregoing, medical, psychiatric, therapeutic, counselling, education, employment, child
welfare, adoption and social services records, personal journals and diaries, and records containing
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requiring that applications be made only to the trial judge, Bill C-46 sought
to prevent disclosure requests from being used at the preliminary inquiry
as a means of intimidating the complainant-the "whack the complainant
strategy" that had been widely deployed by defence counsel in the late
1980s and early 1990s. 6' Bill C-46 reflects the thrust of the minority's
decision in O'Connor by establishing a much more rigorous test for
disclosure. At the first stage, a written application must specify how the
record is not only likely relevant (defined expressly in relation to "an issue
at trial or the competence of the witness to testify") but also how
production is "necessary in the interests of justice." 6 Here, the legislation
listed a number of assertions, which are, on their own, insufficient to meet
the criteria of likely relevance. These include: the existence of the record;
that the record may contain prior inconsistent statements; that the record
may relate to the reliability of the witness because she has received therapy;
that the record may reveal other allegations of sexual abuse; and that the
record relates to sexual reputation.65 In this way, the government sought to
prevent speculative requests for disclosure or "fishing expeditions" based
upon unsupported allegations.66
Crucial among the changes Bill C-46 ushered in was the
requirement that a wider set of concerns be weighed before records can be
released to the trial judge; specifically, "the salutary and deleterious effects
of the determination on the accused's right to make full answer and defence
and on the right to privacy and the equality of the complainant ...
and any

other person to whom the record relates., 67 In contrast to the O'Connor
decision's privileging of the defendants' rights, Bill C-46 directed the trial
judge to take into consideration seven factors prior to viewing the
requested records. These include: the necessity for full answer and defence;
the probative value of the record; the extent of the reasonable expectation
of privacy; the influence of discriminatory myths; the rights of privacy; the
integrity of the trial process; and society's interest in the reporting of sexual

personal information the production or disclosure of which is protected by any other Act of Parliament
or a provincial legislature, but does not include records made by persons responsible for the
investigation or prosecution of the offence."
63 Ibid.,
ss.
278.2(1), 278.2(2).
64 Ibid., ss. 278.3(3), 278.5(2).
65 Ibid., s. 278.3(4).
66 Heather J. Holmes, "An Analysis of Bill C-46: Production of Records in Sexual Offence

Proceedings" (1997) 2 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 71 at 89.
67 CriminalCode, supra note 4, s. 278.5(2).
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offences and the obtaining of treatment by complainants.68 If records pass
this first stage, these same factors are to guide the judge in deciding
whether the documents or edited portions are to be turned over to the
accused.6 9

The objective of section 278 of the CriminalCode is to limit judicial
discretion and to require that fair trial rights be considered in light of the
devastating implications of disclosure for complainants. Yet the form of this
legislation stands as a telling example of the way in which Charter rights
discourse invades and overdetermines legislative reforms. It is not simply
that fair trial rights and the presumed requirements of the Charter
constrained the political response to disclosure, thereby foreclosing the
possibility of legislating statutory privilege. It is also that section 278 inserts
into every disclosure consideration the requirement of a kind of microconstitutional adjudication. While the provisions do attempt to direct a
legal consideration of the social consequences of disclosure (by recognizing
the consequences of permitting access for reporting rates, by considering
the objective of ensuring counselling for those who have experienced
assault, and by accounting for the sway of rape myths), by and large the
balancing equation sidesteps an evaluation of needs, harms, and interests,
in favour of an abstract consideration of rights. The primary focus of the
test for likely relevance and for disclosure is framed and limited by the
consideration of fair trial rights of accused persons as well as the privacy
and equality rights of complainants. And while most trial judges in sexual
assault cases will be very familiar with how fair trial rights can be used to
express the interests and needs of the accused, few judges have any
experience in pouring the concerns of complainants into the containers of
constitutional privacy and equality rights. The discourse of Charterrights
and its reframing of social and political questions as rights contests becomes
indelibly marked on sexual assault law as the quest for disclosure is
constituted as, first and foremost, a battle of rights.
IV.

THE MILLS DECISION

No sooner was section 278 passed, than it was constitutionally
challenged as a violation of the fair trial guarantees of the Charter and

68 Ibid.
69

Ibid., s. 278.7.
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struck down in at least two lower court decisions.70 Because of the
considerable state of uncertainty in the law, the Supreme Court agreed to
hear an instant appeal of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench decision in
R. v. Mills.7" The exchange between the courts and the legislature around
sexual assault, such a marked feature of the post-Charterlandscape, has
nowhere had more moves and complexities than on the question of
disclosure. In Mills, a legislative regime that can be seen as a reply, yet not
a response, to the common law test established by O'Connor,is returned to
the Supreme Court for constitutional adjudication. Some political analysts
characterize the Mills72 decision upholding section 278 as an indication of
a new relationship of constitutional dialogue between the judiciary and
Parliament.73 In upholding section 278, the majority of the Supreme Court
was harshly critical of the unsophisticated constitutional analysis
undertaken in the lower court decision; simply because the legislative
regime for disclosure crafted in Bill C-46 departed from O'Connordoes not
inevitably lead to a finding of unconstitutionality. Instead, the majority
emphasized that the courts "do not hold a monopoly on the protection and
promotion of rights and freedoms" and that, in specifying7 4constitutional
standards, there may be a "range of permissible regimes."
The Mills decision has been widely interpreted as a triumph for
feminists and a defeat for defence counsel. Yet to argue that Mills simply
"upheld" section 278 is to ignore its profound ambiguity. Mills neither
supplanted the Court's decision in O'Connor, nor did it "uphold" the
legislative regime that replaced the O'Connorstandard. Instead, cloaked
under the language of legislative deference and the recognition of
of
complainants' interests in the disclosure battle, is an interpretation
75
section 278 that significantly erodes its meaning and intent.
Each gesture in Mills towards the recognition of complainants'
concerns is simultaneously pushed forward and pulled back. Crucially, the
Court indicated a move away from its previous myopic focus on the accused
versus the state dyad as the only relevant constitutional relationship in
70 Sections 278.1 to 278.9(1) of the CriminalCode, supra note 4 were struck down in: R. v. B.J.M.,
[1997] A.J. No. 891 (Alta. Q.B.) (QL); R. v. Mills,[1997] A.J. No. 1036 (Alta. Q.B.) (QL); and R. v.
Boudreau, [1998] O.J. No. 3526 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL). The sections were upheld in R. v. Hurrie,
[1997] B.C.J. No. 2634 (B.C.S.C.) (QL) and B. v. Regan, [1998] N.S.J. No. 356 (N.S.S.C.) (QL).
71Mills, ibid.
72

Mills, supra note 12.

73Janet L. Hiebert, CharterConflicts (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002) at 116.
Mills, supra note 12 at 712.
75 See Coughlan, supra note 16.
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sexual assault law. In Mills, the Court recognized that defendants' legal
rights must not be allowed to distort the "truth-seeking" function of the
trial process by employing discriminatory myths about rape
victims-including the relatively new rape myth that seeking therapy is an
indication of untrustworthiness.76 In fact, this was the very first time that the
Court invoked the sexual equality guarantees of the Charterin deciding a
sexual assault case. As the majority acknowledged, in passing Bill C-46, "...
Parliament ... sought to recognize the prevalence of sexual violence, ... to
encourage the reporting of incidents of sexual violence, ... to recognize the

impact of the production of personal information on the efficacy of
treatment, and to reconcile fairness to complainants with the rights of the
accused."77

Yet the majority's gestures to equality and to societal concerns are
tempered by its framing of complainants' claims through a narrow
conception of "privacy." As the ruling emphasized, the disclosure of
confidential information in the context of sexual assault trials inevitably
infringes on the privacy rights of the complainant, defined negatively here
as the "interest in being left alone by the state."7 " Individuals have a right
to control the "dissemination of confidential information."79 As the
majority acknowledged, in the particular context of therapeutic
relationships, privacy is essential for trust and, where confidentiality is
threatened, so too is the complainant's mental integrity and security of the
person. 80 Underpinning this discussion, however, is a highly individualistic
and atomistic understanding of complainants' concerns. These concerns are
defined primarily in terms of the right to "own one's stories." This kind of
analysis conceives the complainant as an isolated individual, not caught up
in a web of power relationships that influence her ability to construct an
authoritative version of events. In the majority's insistence that "every man
[sic] has a right to keep his own sentiments,"81 there is an implicit emphasis
on containment and a refusal to acknowledge the creative, communicative,
and productive importance of speaking about rape outside the context of
the courtroom.
Perhaps more concretely important to complainants seeking
76
77
78

Mills, supra note 12 at 719, 727, 741.
Ibid. at 712.
Ibid. at 721-22.

79 Ibid. at 722.
80
Ibid. at 723-24.
81 Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303 at 2379 (K.B.), cited in ibid. at 722.
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protection of their records than judicial pronouncements about equality
and privacy rights was the majority's interpretation of the meaning of
subsection 278.3(4). Subsection 278.3(4) lists a number of myth-ridden
assertions, which, on their own, are insufficient to meet the criteria of likely
relevance. The Court argued that this provision does not prevent defence
counsel from relying on any one of the listed assertions, but that in order
to meet the test of likely relevance, mere assertion is insufficient. Instead,
there must exist an evidentiary or informational foundation to support the
records' likely relevance to a trial issue or to the competence of a witness
to testify; there must be case specific evidence or information that goes
beyond general assertion. This insistence on an evidentiary foundation
could provide a strong barrier to "fishing expeditions"-speculative
requests for records production.
Yet, once again, this gesture in the direction of complainants is
pulled back by the majority's virtual rewriting of the legislative regime.
Steve Coughlan goes so far as to argue that "the Court did its best to
interpret the legislation to conform to its earlier judgement in O'Connor."83
As the majority emphasized, where legislation is open to several possible
interpretations, it is incumbent upon the courts to interpret it in a
constitutional manner.84 This allowed the majority to massage the test for
disclosure laid out in the legislation in such a way that fair trial rights once
again assume a position of pre-eminence. The ruling repeatedly stressed
that section 278 retains judicial discretion, positioning the final decision of
likely relevance in the subjective hands of the trial judge: "[the test] does
not supplant the ultimate discretion of the trial judge ...
the trial judge is

the ultimate arbiter in deciding whether the likely relevance threshold ...
is met. ' MEven though subsection 278.5(2) codified a list of considerations
to frame the analysis of likely relevance-in this way seeking to limit
judicial discretion-the Mills majority transforms these criteria into a
"checklist" of various factors which "may come into play during a judge's
deliberation."86 The considerations enumerated in the legislation include
social concerns and objectives that extend beyond the framework of
competing constitutional rights, such as the influence of "discriminatory
myths," "society's interest in reporting," and ensuring that victims receive
82

Mills, supra note 12 at 741.
83 Coughlan, supra note 16 at 301.
84 Mills, supra note 12 at 690.
Ibid. at 742.
86Ibid. at 749. See also Coughlan, supra note 16 at 306.
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counselling. Through the majority's slight of hand, social considerations are
effectively reconstructed as optional concerns that need not be used in
reaching decisions on production and disclosure. And, in a move which
arguably erodes the very thrust of section 278, the majority insists that
where there is any doubt about the likely relevance of the records, the
"interests of justice" require that the trial judge must "take the next step in
viewing the documents."87 In its insistence that "in borderline cases, the
judge should err on the side of production," the Mills majority effectively
redefines the purposive meaning of Bill C-460' Indeed as Justice Binnie
recently opined for the majority in R. v. Shearing,89 "I cannot agree that Mills
has shifted away from the primary emphasis on the rights of the accused
because Mills itself affirms the primacy-in the last resort-of the
requirement of a fair trial to avoid the wrongful conviction of the innocent."
It is clear that the Mills decision is, in the end, highly contradictory.
For now, the final Supreme Court pronouncement on disclosure regimes
appears to uphold legislation that differed from its own common law test
but arguably returns the law to a position that is much closer to the Court's
original position. The post-Mills landscape is highly conflictual, the site of
an endless push and pull between the colonizing impetus of legal discourse
and the protection of extra-legal discursive spaces where women can tell
their stories out from under laws' shadow. The contradictions inherent in
the Mills decision give birth to divergent, although linked, themes that mark
the judicial consideration of confidential records since late 1999.
V.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POST-MILLS CASES ON
ACCESS TO COMPLAINANTS' RECORDS

If one were to accept the conventional interpretation of Mills as a
decision that erodes fair trial rights by upholding a strict legislative test for
production and disclosure, one might expect that defence counsel would
have altered their strategies accordingly to avoid the costs, complications,
and risks involved in applications for records. There is, however, a very
strong indication that records applications have remained a crucial weapon
in defence counsels' arsenal for discrediting claims of sexual assault. It is
not possible to determine through case analyses how frequent production
and disclosure requests arise in the post-Mills context. Nevertheless, both
before and after the release of the Mills decision, criminal lawyers and their
87
88

Mills, supra note 12 at 751-52.

Ibi. at 748.
89 (2002), 214 D.L.R. (4h) 215 (S.C.C.) [Shearing].
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associations began to strategize on how to deploy the section 278 regime to
their advantage. Prior to Mills, the Criminal Lawyers Association held a
"study day" to advise their members on how to prepare and argue a section
278 application.90 As Leslie Pringle counselled,
[A] successful application to produce third party records may be critical. In some cases, it has
resulted in the Crown actually withdrawing the charges after a review of the records. In
others, it has been the key to successful exposure of weaknesses in the complainants' version
of events. For the complainant, it may be the beginning of an embarrassing examination of
intensely private and personal topics... .91

Following the Mills decision, an article in the Criminal Lawyers
Association newsletter emphasized the continued importance of records
applications:
What is portrayed as an invasion of the complainant's privacy is in reality an essential tool
in the appropriate case to ensure that a person [sic] accused of a serious charge of sexual
assault receive a fair trial. The importance of pursuing these types of applications, when
appropriate, cannot be overstated ... . When applying for the production of third party
records, defence counsel should be relentless in reminding the courts that "it can never be
in the interests of justice for the accused to be denied the right to make full answer and
92
defence" (quote from Mills majority).

As this article highlights, Mills is a decision rife with tensions, some
of which can be used to the advantage of defendants in their quests for
records. It is for this reason that records applications remain a contested
issue in the case law.
In order to dissect the meaning and implications of the Mills
decision, I have analyzed thirty-seven post-Mills cases (twenty-five trial
cases and twelve appellate cases) concerning access to confidential records
(see Appendix A). All of these cases appear in the legal database Quicklaw
and cover the period between the December 1999 release of the Mills
decision until mid-2002. Most of these cases apply the ambiguous and
contradictory principles enunciated by the Supreme Court to the facts of
specific cases and most concern decisions about the likely relevance of
90 Carol Letman, Section 278Applications (Materials prepared for Criminal Lawyers Association
Annual Spring Education Programme) in PracticalApplications: A User-FriendlyGuide to Motions in
CriminalProceedings(Toronto: Ontario Criminal Lawyers Association, 1999); Leslie Pringle, ThirdParty
RecordApplications (Materials prepared for Criminal Lawyers Association Annual Spring Education
Programme) in PracticalApplications: A User-Friendly Guide to Motions in Criminal Proceedings
(Toronto: Ontario Criminal Lawyers Association, 1999).
Ibid.
92 Steven Skurka & Elsa Renzella, "Defending a Sexual Assault Case: Third Party Record
Production" (2000) 21 For the Defence 32 at 32.
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records under section 278 (twenty-seven cases, see Appendix B). Other
cases rule on what kinds of records should be incorporated within the scope
of section 278 and, in particular, the meaning that should be given to the
phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy." My analysis also includes cases
that do not directly engage the interpretation of section 278, but
nonetheless raise crucial issues concerning access to the confidential
records of complainants. For example, the court in R. v. Shearing93
dismissed the application of section 278 to a diary that had fallen into the
hands of the accused and ruled on the scope of cross-examination on this
diary. R. v. Stewart,94 a British Columbia Court of Appeal decision,
considered a stay granted because the Crown suggested that some
complainants would become suicidal should their records be released.
As Karen Busby notes in her analysis of pre-Mills disclosure cases,
decisions that are found on Quicklaw are not representative and do not
constitute an accurate sampling of the range of situations in which
applications are made.95 Yet these cases are the ones that will be cited in
the future evolution of section 278, thereby providing an important
indication of emerging legal trends. My central analytic focus is the manner
in which the decisions interpret the Mills balancing equation, the meanings
they attach to constitutional rights claims that are a feature of each
disclosure consideration, and crucially, their discursive consequences. In
particular, as I have suggested through the interrogation of these decisions,
we can observe precise mechanisms for the disqualification of
complainants, the increasing hegemony of a liberal legalistic and
individualistic discourse of rape, and an emergent ideal construct: the new
ideal rape victim.
In order to lay a foundation for this legal and discursive analysis, it
is useful to provide an overview of the general characteristics of these cases.

Shearing, supra note 89.
[2000] B.C.J. No. 1815 (B.C.C.A.) (QL) [Stewart].
Busby, supra note 17 at 359.
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The Gendered Characterof the Cases

The post-Mills cases reflect the inherently gendered nature of
sexualized coercion; recent Canadian statistics show that while 98 per cent
of sex offenders are men, 82 per cent of survivors are women and girls.96 All
(100 per cent) of the 37 accused individuals in these cases were male and
most, except for 6 adolescents, were adult men. By contrast, of 118
complainants, there was not one case in which assault against an adult man
was alleged: 105 (89 per cent) were women and girls and 11 (9 per cent)
were male children or adolescents at the time of the alleged assaults. In 2
cases, the complainant's gender was not indicated.
B.

RelationshipsBetween the Accused and the Complainants

Consistent with Busby's findings on the pre-Mills case law, all of the
cases involved defendants who had personal or professional relationships
with the complainants.97 There is not one single case of stranger rape
among the cases analyzed. In the twenty-seven cases, where it was possible
to determine the nature of the relationship between the accused and
complainant[s], sixwere fathers/stepfathers, sixwere other family members
(including brothers, uncles, and brothers-in-law), five were family friends
and other acquaintances, two were ex-common law spouses, one was a
roommate in a children's home, and one was a fellow student. There were
five defendants who had had professional relationships with the
complainants, including: a religious leader, a doctor, a probation officer, a
group home worker, and a therapist. In part, the existence of close
relationships between the accused and complainants merely reflects the
statistical likelihood (69 per cent) that complainants will know their
attackers.98 It also suggests, however, that defendants who know their
accusers can rely on their own personal information to determine the
existence and nature of records.

96 Statistics Canada, "Sex Offenders" (1999) 19 Juristat 1 at 1.
97

Busby, supra note 17 at 361.
98 Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children , Statistic
Sheet:
Sexual Assault (Toronto: METRAC, 2001),
online: METRAC <http://www.metrac.org/new/
statsex.htm>. This statistic is based on a study undertaken by the Ontario Women's Directorate. See
Ontario Women's Directorate, Factsand Statistics:Preventing ViolenceAgainst Women (Toronto: OWD,
1995), online: OWD Homepage <http.www.gov.on.ca/citizenship/owd/english/facts/preventing.htm>.
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Extensively Documented Complainants

Previous research has suggested that those complainants who have
been extensively documented are particularly vulnerable to records
applications, including children in care, people with disabilities and mental
health histories, aboriginal women, and women of colour. 99 It was not
possible to analyze this prediction on the basis of the case law analysis
because very little information is provided about the complainants. In three
cases that involved complainants with developmental delays, defendants
used their expansive records to suggest incompetency or faulty perception.
The decisions were completely silent about the racial background of the
complainants (in only one case was the race of the accused noted). While
several defendants sought to paint their accusers as delusional or suffering
from mental illness, these assertions were frequent and most often
appeared to lack a concrete foundation. It would therefore risk
misrepresentation to try to categorize the complainants on the basis of
mental illness.
D.

Prevalenceof Applications in Cases Involving Assaults Against
Minors and HistoricalAllegations

While much about the complainants is obscured in the text of the
decisions, it is clearly apparent that most are (or have been) vulnerable
children, some of whom have been in care and many with child welfare
records. Almost 90 per cent of the complaints at issue in the post-Mills
cases were of sexual offences against adolescents or children; 78 per cent
of the cases concern allegations of past assaults. This finding suggests that
records applications may be a feature of cases where children and
adolescents are complainants and where complainants allege past abuse.
The frequency with which the disclosure case law deals with historic abuse
claims and contemporary assault claims made by minors implies that these
allegations are regarded with suspicion and are seen to require external
corroboration.
E.

Records Sought

In most of the application cases, defendants sought multiple
records. In one extremely sweeping application, medical and therapeutic
records were sought from sixty-three complainants. Again echoing Busby's
99 See MacCrimmon & Boyle, supra note
47.
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findings on the pre-Mills case law,'t° counselling and therapeutic records
were the most commonly sought records (eighteen cases), followed by
applications for child welfare records (twelve cases). Medical and hospital
records were sought in nine cases and diaries in four cases. Other records
at issue were: educational (four cases); correctional (one case); criminal
injuries compensation claims (one case); and police investigative reports of
unrelated allegations (one case).
VI.

POST-MILLS CASE LAW AND THE FINDING OF NOT
LIKELY RELEVANT: PRIVACY AND THE LIBERAL
LEGAL SUBJECT
What characterizes [rape's] eventfulness? ... Does it take place in alleys and bedrooms or in
the courtroom, where rape becomes a matter of a woman's credibility and psychological
coherence almost more than it concerns her body and its integrity?'0 '

As Larcombe insists in her insightful analysis of the constructed
distinction between the ideal rape victim and the everyday complainant,
cases in which the complainant "wins" are just as problematic for feminist
critics as the wholesale discrediting process that marks the rape trial."0 2
Such cases not only function as symbolic public testimonies of law's claim
to justice, they also act to affirm a specific and narrow understanding of
sexualized violence-as unusual, as individualized, and as capable of being
resolved and redressed through the criminal justice system. Such cases also
work to construct the characteristics of the ideal victim, a symbolic and
unreal construct, who serves as the measure of any real complainant's
credibility. The post-Mills cases in which complainants' records are found
not likely relevant are admittedly not "good" cases. We do not know the
outcome of the cases-for example, whether a conviction was secured and
what kinds of scrutiny and reality-testing a complainant had to endure to
qualify for legal redress. In most of the cases I have analyzed, all that is
available is a decision about whether the records pass the threshold test for
production.0 3 But this decision is nonetheless crucial, for it reveals the line
100 Busby, supra note 17 at 369-72.
101 Hengehold, "Remapping", supra note 27 at 192.
102 Larcombe, supra note 32 at
132.
103 Only five cases dealt with the question of disclosure to the accused. I have not dealt with these
decisions specifically, but I have included them in my analysis of likely relevance. In one case, the record
produced was not disclosed: see R. v. W.P.N., [2000] N.W.T.J. No. 15 (S.C.) (QL) [W.P.N.]. In four
cases, some or all records, or portions thereof were disclosed: see R v. Hammond, [2002] O.J. No. 1596
(Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (QL) [Hammond] (decided on basis that there was not a "reasonable expectation
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between law's colonization of extra-legal spaces where complainants have
"told" their stories of sexualized violence and the "protection" of these
spaces. Decisions on likely relevance also expose the terms on which this
line is drawn and what kinds of stories and complainants will qualify for the
tenuous protections of section 278. This line, as we will see, is unstable and
marked by both the ambiguities of the Mills decision and its narrow
construction of complainants' concerns as the entitlement to privacy rights.
This, in turn, depends upon the success of the complainant's performance
of the ideal victim.
The Mills majority's insistence on the necessity of an evidentiary or
informational foundation to ground a finding of the likely relevance of
records' 4 has positively impacted on post-Mills case law. Indeed, it is largely
because of this insistence that there is a reduced likelihood of production.
As Busby's research revealed, almost 67 per cent of records applications
passed O'Connor's relaxed threshold test for production to the judge."0 5
Using Busby's criteria of "all or most" of the records produced, my analyses
of post-Mills decisions reveals a lower likelihood of a finding of likely
relevance. In 33 per cent of the decisions on likely relevance that I have
analyzed, the courts ordered all or most of the records to be produced.
Busby's study, however, fails to elaborate on how she has defined "all or
most." If I add to my analysis the four cases in which some records (often
important and multiple records) were ordered produced, then the rate of
a finding of likely relevance rises to 48 per cent (see Appendix B for a list
of decisions on likely relevance).
The Mills decision, emphasizing the necessity of judicial discretion,
offers a set of contradictory rationales from which judges can pick and
choose in justifying a decision of likely relevance. In cases in which records
did not pass the threshold for production, judges relied heavily on the Mills'
criteria of case-specific "evidence" that would raise an assertion of likely
relevance from the level of the general to the specific. Quite frequently,
under the O'Connorrules, records were produced on the basis of the simple6
claim that they may have contained statements about the alleged attack.'
In those post-Mills decisions in which records were found not likely
of privacy") (QL); R. v. W.G., [2000] N.J. No.86 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D.)) (QL) [W.G.]; R v. L.P.M., [2000]
O.J. No. 4076 (Sup. Ct.) (QL) [L.P.M.]; R v. W.C., [1999] M.J. No. 542 (Q.B.) (QL). There are far too
few disclosure decisions to reach any conclusions about emerging legal trends, for example, on its
frequency or on its judicial justifications.
104 Mills, supra note 12 at 740-42.
105 Busby, supra note 17 at
383.
106 Gotell, "State Discourse", supra note 59 at 325-29.
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relevant, judges argued that simple assertion, based on speculation and
myth, is no longer sufficient to support an order for production.
Quickly following the Mills decision, some lower court judges began
to apply section 278 in a way that, in the words of the defence bar, "created
a high ... threshold as to the type of information required to meet the likely
relevance test."" For example, in R. v. P.E., 8the Ontario Court of Appeal

agreed with the trial judge and found that the accused had not established
that the records at issue were likely relevant. This was a case of historical
sexual abuse in which a thirty-seven year old complainant alleged long term
abuse by her stepfather ending when she was sixteen years old. The
requested records related to therapy that this woman had undergone at the
time she made a police report. The Court of Appeal found that submissions
stressing the temporal connection between the counselling and the making
of the complaint, and the simple fact that the charges were discussed
amounted to nothing more than bare assertions that failed to provide an
evidentiary foundation. A similar conclusion is reached in R. v. Batte,'0
another complex historical abuse case, widely cited as an authority on the
application of the case-specific evidence criteria. Batte was an appeal case
not decided under the Mills section 278 regime, but under the O'Connor
regime because it was the one in place when the initial decision was
rendered. Nonetheless, Justice Doherty argued, citingMills,assertion is not
enough to support production even under the common law test. Simply
because "a complainant said something about a matter which could be the
subject of cross-examination at trial, does not raise a reasonable possibility
that the complainant's statement will have some probative value in the
assessment of her credibility."" 0 As he elaborates, "[An] accused must
point to 'case specific evidence or information' to justify that assertion. In
my view, the accused must be able to point to something in the record ... that
suggests that the recordscontain informationthat is not already availableto the
defence."'

TheBatte requirement that something in the record must constitute
new and otherwise unavailable information strengthens the threshold test
for likely relevance. This criterion was used in several post-Mills cases to

107 Skurka & Renzella, supra note 92 at 35.
108 [20001 O.J. No. 574 (C.A.) (QL) [P.E.].

109 [20001 49 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.) [Battel.
110 Ibid. at 342.

M Ibid. at 341 [emphasis added].
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deny production. 112 In R. v. Sutherland,"3 for example, a developmentally
disabled woman was sexually assaulted by an acquaintance. A few days
later, she spoke with a support worker at an organization that provides
assistance in community living and the police were subsequently called.
Despite the fact that this meeting may have precipitated a police report, the
Ontario Court of Appeal, following the trial judge, refused to order
production. The Court of Appeal noted that the complainant had made
four largely consistent statements about the assault and that the support
workers notes, which did not go into the details of the assault, would have
produced no new information to the defence.114
These decisions are indeed important in shrouding records from
speculative production requests. But it is also crucial to interrogate the
discourse on which these positive decisions are based and, in particular, the
manner in which they construct complainants' concerns in the battle over
confidential records. Drawing on the Mills decision, these trial and
appellate decisions define the protection of records as primarily and almost
exclusively a matter of "privacy" and "privacy rights."'".5 Here, the
abstractions of Charter-rights discourse, in which complexities of systemic
sexual violence and questions about the relative authority of claims of
coercive sexuality are filtered through a constricted discourse of privacy,
can be observed. The "right" to "be left alone by the state" and "to control
the dissemination of personal information" overdetermines the judicial
consideration of the harmful consequences of access to complainants'
records. One significant example of the myopic legal focus on privacy is R.
V. R.C.," 6 a case in which counselling records were sought in order to
provide foundation for the claim that a "religious" complainant felt
112 R v. D.M (2000), 37 C.R. ( 5 b) 80 at 93 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [D.M.]; R. v. P.J.S., [2000] Y.J" No. 119
at para. 26 (S.C.) (OL) [P.J.S.]; R. v. Sutherland (2001), 156 C.C.C. (3d) 264 at 270 (N.S.C.A.)
[Sutherland]; R. v. D.WL. (2001), 194 N.S.R. (2d) 379 at 388 (C.A.) [D. W.L.]; R v. MG., [2001] M.J.
No. 61 at para. 19 (Prov. Ct.) (QL) [M.G.]; R. v. Thompson, [2001] O.J. No. 2900 at para. 6 (Sup. Ct.)
(QL) [Thompson]; and R v. S.P., [2001] O.J. No. 2898 at para. 10 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
113 Sutherland, ibid.
114 Ibid. at 271.
115 The following cases cite no consideration but privacy: R v. Clifford (2002), 58 O.R.
(3d) 257
at 271-72 (C.A.) [Clifford];Thompson, supra note 112 at para. 3; and W.P.N., supra note 103 at para. 4.
In some cases, other considerations such as equality or society's interest in reporting are simply listed,
but never elaborated and the primary emphasis remains on "privacy" unconnected to any other
concerns. See D. W.L., supra note 112; P.J.S., supra note 112 at paras. 8-9; and MG., supra note 112 at
paras. 14-15. In only one case is their some recognition of equality, discriminatory myths, and reporting
that is meaningfully connected with the privacy of confidential records: see R v. Tatchell (2001), 207
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 131 at 137 (Nfld. S.C. (T.D.)) [Tatchell].
116 Clifford, ibid.
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"shame" because of her sexual relationship with the accused and had
therefore lied to protect her "reputation." Ignoring the broader purposes
of Bill C-46, the Ontario Court of Appeal defined the purpose of section
278 as being solely about the protection of privacy. As the Court states, "the
point of the provisions is that the complainant has the right to be left alone
in these highly personal areas unless the accused can meet the test set out
by Parliament."'' 7
What is troubling about this narrow focus on privacy is that it
encourages a kind of legal analysis that is both degendered and
decontextualized. Privacy is constructed as an abstract good, apart from any
consideration of the specific consequences of defence access to
complainants' records in the context of sexual assault trials. Janine Benedet,
writing about the use of sexual history evidence, argues that this is wrong
not because it constitutes an invasion of privacy, but instead because sexual
assault evidence undermines sexual equality."' While it is not clear to me
that even "equality rights" could provide a framework amenable to
capturing the complexities of production and disclosure, at least equality
discourse could permit a fuller analysis of the uses of confidential records
and the assumptions that inform this strategy. Even though the legislative
framework established by section 278 asks the courts to weigh the accused's
legal rights against the privacy and equality rights of
complainants-considering factors such as "discriminatory myths," society's
interest in reporting, and ensuring counselling for complainants-rarely are
any concerns other than privacy (and fair trial rights) acknowledged. This
narrow analysis is rooted directly in Mills' emphasis on privacy and its
construction of societal and equality concerns as secondary and subordinate
considerations, which may or may not frame the determination of likely
relevance. Of the fourteen cases in which records were found not likely
relevant, only four cases even mentioned "equality""' 9 and only three cases
noted the goal of encouraging reporting of sexual offences. 2 ' Most often,
these considerations are given no elaboration. In only one case could it be
suggested that an equality analysis influenced the determination of not
likely relevant. In R. v. Tatchell, a case in which residential school records
were sought for a blind and developmentally delayed complainant, the
court cautioned that the application may be based on "the discriminatory
117Ibid. at 272.
118 Benedet, supra note 5 at 107.
119 Tatchell, supra note 115 at 137; P.J.S., supra note 112 at paras. 8-9; and M.G., supra note
112
at paras. 14-15.
120 Tatchell, ibid.; D. W.L., supra note 112 at 390; and M. (D.), supra note 112 at 94.
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belief that all persons with an intellectual disability ...are incapable of

telling the truth" and suggested that the release of such records would
discourage reporting by those with "intellectual disabilities.''
Judicial resistance to considerations beyond privacy is even carried
to the point of hostility in the Stewart122 trial decision, a case involving sixtyfour complainants claiming indecent assault and rape against a British
Columbia doctor. At the records application stage, the Crown had raised
the fear of suicide should the records of some complainants be released.
The trial judge's reaction was to stay all charges. In high rhetoric, he
claimed that recognizing suicide as a potential consequence of records
disclosure inevitably tainted his decision on the applications: "... if I do

make a ruling in favour of the accused, you are saying to me, Well, you may
have just killed her.' ' 123 Of course, there is no reason why health concerns
should not be allowed to factor into a consideration of "the salutary and
deleterious effects" of production and disclosure. While the stay decision
was overturned on appeal, the Stewart decision stands as an extreme
example of a pervasive judicial resistance to recognizing the complex and
profoundly harmful consequences of records disclosure that extend well
beyond controlling personal information. Through the legal emphasis on
"privacy," the obfuscation of the social context, and the power-ridden
implications of access to records, the construction of sexualized violence as
a discrete event that occurs between isolated individuals is both enforced
and enacted.
The discourse of privacy provides unstable ground for the
protection of complainants from invasive credibility probing. This is
revealed by interrogating the underside of decisions in which records are
found not likely relevant. Judges are often quite eloquent in their
elaboration of factors which may have pushed an application over the
threshold for production. It is through these elaborations that we can
observe the construction of the ideal victim, whose characteristics mirror
the liberal legal subject. To claim the protections of privacy rights, one must
assume the standpoint of the rational liberal legal subject: one must
articulate a straightforward and consistent account capable (often at an
early stage in the trial process) of meeting the test of historical truth, and
one must squeeze the ambiguities and complexities of coercive heterosex
into the binary logic of the consent/coercion dichotomy. Complainants who
are represented as failing to meet standards of consistency, rationality, and
121 Tatchell, ibid. at 132, 137.
122 Supra note 94.
123 Ibid. at para. 15.
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psychological coherence risk losing the protections afforded by privacy
rights.
Judicial comments about the kind of factors that might push records
into the category of likely relevance mark these largely positive decisions.
What joins these commentaries together is their emphasis on the threat of
therapeutic and other forms of contamination and the spectre of false

memories. In many decisions, judges were emphatic in their insistence that
these were not situations involving questionable therapeutic practices or
faulty memories." In P.E., for example, the judge held that "there was
nothing to suggest that the complainant had recovered these memories of
abuse or that the counselling had influenced her memory."' 25 Similarly, in
Batte, the judge affirmed that, "... there was no evidence that the

counselling process played any role in reviving, refreshing, or shaping the
memory of [the complainant].' ' 126 The M.A.S. decision draws a line:
"There was no evidence that there were questions asked by the worker ...
[that may have]
tainted the complaint ....What is frowned upon, of course, is any manipulation,
psychological or otherwise, of a person to persuade him or her to lay charges.... Here, there
was no evidence to support a finding that illegal, improper, unethical or questionable
practices or methods were employed.'127

These repeated denials of disorder, manipulation, and faulty
memories serve as a warning about just how fragile the protections afforded
by privacy may be. Complainants are always vulnerable to being constructed
as troubled and delusional. In cases where records are either produced or
released, complainants' [in]ability to resist these presumptive constructions
depends upon the success or failure of their performance as the ideal rape

victim, a construct marked by the psychological coherence and the
consistency of their claims. This performance remains a target for defence
124 See also P.J.S., supra note 112 at paras 14-15: "the evidence, in fact, is that the complainant
asserts that she remembers well what took place ...
I do not find anywhere in the evidence which was
presented ...
that her memory is questionable. [There is no case specific evidence] supporting the
assertion that the records would help a faulty memory or that the records would disclose acts which
tended to impair or distort the perceived memory." See also W.P.N., supra note 103 at para. 14: "so it
is not a situation where either the initial disclosure was made during therapy or that the complaint's
memory of the alleged abuse was somehow "recovered" during therapy." See also M.(D.), supra note
112 at para. 21: "there is no mental health profile of the complainant giving rise to concern about her
capacity to observe record, recall and report any abuse experienced": R v. E.A.N., [2000] B.C.J. No. 298
154 at 158 (C.A.) (QL): "in particular, [the complainant's] therapydid not ever involve ...
the restoration
of memory" (quoting affidavit evidence of the therapist).
125 Supra note 108 at 373.
126 Supra note 109 at 340.
127

R.v. M.A.S. (2001), 151 Man. R. (2d) 264 at 267 (Q.B.).
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strategies aimed at challenging the clarity and distinctness of memories,
suggesting that a complainant misremembers or misinterprets what she
does remember.
VII. POST-MILLS CASE LAW AND THE FINDING OF LIKELY
RELEVANT: THE HYSTERIZATION OF THE RAPE
COMPLAINANT
If some recent decisions rely on Mills' insistence on the lack of an
evidentiary foundation in refusing production, others also rely on the
opposing elements withiii the Mills decision to justify a finding of likely
relevance. Even though the post-Mills case law as a whole indicates a
reduced likelihood of successful applications, the interpretation of the test
for access in decisions ordering production and sometimes disclosure is
deeply troubling. It not only suggests avenues for manipulating the section
278 balancing equation to permit continued and invasive credibility
probing, but also rests upon repetitive construction of complainants as
hysterical and incoherent, thus disentitled to the privacy that can only
shroud the rational legal subject.
In some cases, records are disclosed because they are found to fall
outside the regime established by section 278. These cases are often based
on a finding of a lack of a "reasonable expectation of privacy in the
records," holding that since the records in question contain statements to
authorities, there is an expectation that authorities will investigate and act
and, therefore, the records fall outside the boundaries of expected
privacy." It has been confirmed, for example, that complainants have "no
reasonable expectation of privacy" in criminal injury compensation claims
because of the public nature of these proceedings. 29 In KA. G., letters to
school officials describing allegations against a fellow student are also
deemed to fall outside the expectation of privacy.13 ° More troubling than
the exclusion of records clearly related to the allegations at issue was the
decision in Hammond, 3' where it was decided that police investigative
reports about an unrelated complaint be disclosed to the accused. Here the
judge ruled that the section 278 regime did not apply. Even though the
police reports were from a completely separate incident, they were ordered
128 See R. v. KA.G. (2001), 192 N.S.R. (2d) 5 at 7 (Fan. Ct.) [KA.G.].
129
13 0

R v. L.S., 120001 O.J. No. 3991 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
KA.G., supra note 128.

131 Hammond,supra note 103.
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released to the accused under the Crown's disclosure obligations. 32 That
the accused sought to use these records based on an unsubstantiated claim
that the records might establish a pattern of making false complaints is not
subjected to any rigorous judicial analysis. As the judge
concluded-drawing on Mills, though sidestepping ' 33section
278-"uncertainty should be resolved in favour of the accused.'
The privileging of the accuseds' rights, the tenuous protections
afforded by privacy, and the potential to avoid the legislative regime for the
disclosure of confidential records are starkly illustrated in the recent
Supreme Court decision in Shearing.13 This case involved multiple
allegations of historical sexual offences against the leader of a quasireligious cult. Shearing is a complicated case, raising issues not only about
the scope of section 278, but also about similar fact evidence and proper
limits on cross-examination. Most relevant to this discussion was the
question of whether the diary of one of the adult women complainants,
who, as a child, had lived with the accused, was covered by the section 278
regime. This diary, kept for a brief period during the alleged offences, had
been left behind by the complainant when she had m'ved out some twentytwo years before the trial. During the trial, the diary had fallen into the
hands of the accused who sought to cross-examine the complainant on her
failure to record the alleged abuse.
With seven judges in the majority and two in dissent, the Supreme
Court curtly dismissed the applicability of section 278 to the diary.
Rejecting the claim that the diary should be returned to the complainant so
that the accused could make an application for disclosure, the majority
argued colloquially that this "would seem ...
to shut the barn door after the

horse has escaped."' 35 The majority gives short shrift to the complainant's
interests, arguing that because violation of her privacy rights had already
occurred and because the diary was already in the possession of the
defence, the proper question was not disclosure but admissibility.'36 On this
question, the Court ruled that "the nature and scope of KWG's diary did
not raise privacy or other concerns of such importance as to 'substantially
132 Ibid. at paras. 13-16. These obligations were established inR v. Stinchcombe, [199113 S.C.R.
326, where the majority articulated a strong and expansive interpretation of accused's rights under
section 7 of the Charter, supra note 2, and on this foundation broadened the Crown's obligation of
disclosure to include all information relevant to the defence.
133 Hammond, ibid. at para. 27.
34

1 Supra note 89 (Justice L'Heureux-DubM & Justice Gonthier dissenting on this issue at 259-71).
135 Ibid. at 245.
136 Ibid. at 249.
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outweigh' the appellant's fair trial right to cross-examine on the diary ....
"
(both the selected entries permitted by the trial judge and the absence of
entries) t37 Here, even the slanted balancing of rights envisioned by Mills is
avoided in a decision that arguably reinvents the doctrine of recent
complaint. 3 8 Underlying the majority's analysis is the construction of a
good rape victim, one who behaves in certain ways. If a complainant records
her daily life in a diary, then it is expected that she will record incidents of
abuse. A set of expectations about the appropriate and rational behaviour
of ideal victims provides the unspoken backdrop to this decision, despite
the majority's protestations to the contrary. Such "rational" behaviour, in
turn, acts as a set of standards by which a real complainant's actions are
measured and her failing engineered. In the end, what Shearing tells us is
that it is not only what complainants have said and written about their
assaults that can be opened to legal invasion, it is also what is not said and
not written.
The repeated hysterization of complainants and the orchestration
of a dissonance between real complainants and the ideal rape victim also
informs cases where records are found to fall within the scope of section
278. These discursive moves are both shrouded and enabled by the Mills
decision's privileging of defendants' rights. The Mills' majority's stress on
the importance of judicial discretion,139 its reframing of section 278's
guidance on factors that should be considered as simply a checklist, 4 ' and
its argument that fair trial rights must prevail in "uncertain" situations.4' are
all widely cited in the cases where records have been ordered produced and
sometimes disclosed to the accused. As Coughlan has suggested, the effect
of Mills may be to resurrect O'Connor's low threshold test for likely
relevance under the rhetoric of judicial deference. 142 Indeed, the argument
that Mills does not displace the pre-eminence of fair trial rights within
sexual assault law receives strong support in this set of cases. Most often,
the tone of these decisions is highly conclusory. Judges will often simply
review the facts of the case, describe the records sought, summarize defence
submissions, quote (most often without any interpretation) the provisions
137 Ibi. at 258.
138 Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, for the dissent, argues that "the assumption that 'silence speaks
volumes' is unfounded, and by itself cannot lead to the conclusion that no assault occurred," ibid. at 267.
139 Mills, supra note 12 at 745, 747-49,
754.
140 Ibid. at 749

141 ms
142
Ibid.
142 Coughlan, supra note 16 at 306.
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of section 278, and then, on the basis of a selective reading of the Mills
decision, render a decision. Decisions to produce and sometimes disclose
records are most frequently justified by referring to the Mills argument that,
where there is any doubt, records should be produced in the interest of
justice.'43 The reconstruction of the test for likely relevance to accord with
O'Connor'sexclusive emphasis on fair trial rights is succinctly put in R. v.
L. G.: "production of these records to the trial Judge for his [sic] review is
one of those borderline cases in which I should err on the side of ordering
production.""'
When this interpretation of Mills is used, a finding of likely
relevance is always already available. Privacy rights afford shaky grounds
for resisting production when fair trial rights are conceived of as trumps
and when defence counsel can construct complainants as disordered,
delusional, and thus undeserving of privacy. In very few cases where records
are found likely relevant is the complainant constructed as simply
untruthful. In R. v. D.P.F., social service records relating to an adolescent
complainant were ordered produced based upon allegations that she had
made two other "false" allegations of abuse.' There appeared to be little
to support the suggestion that that these complaints had been "false," and
on the face of it, this was an unsupported "assertion" that would seem to
fail the requirement of case-specific evidence. Similarly, in R. v. Hudson,
multiple group home records of two adolescent girls were produced, based
on claims by the defence that accusations against a group home worker had
been fabricated in response to some unspecified disciplinary problem and
to show that the girls had seen a movie that depicted a vaguely similar
incident of abuse.' 46 Underpinning both of these cases is the assumption
that adolescent girls maliciously fabricate allegations and are inherently
suggestible. Because the three complainants each had extensive child
welfare, medical, and social service records, the cases also suggest the
vulnerability of those documented in multiple public records to production
applications. But cases in which records are produced on the basis of
defence theories of fabrication and motive to lie are relatively infrequent
143 This passage from Mills is specifically quoted as the ultimate rationale
relevance" in the following decisions: Hammond, supra note 103 at para. 23; R.
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 224 at 237 (Nfld. S.C.(T.D.)) [Fleming];R v. L.G., [2000] O.J.
para. 76 and 85 (QL) [L.G.]; and R. v. CS. (2000),195 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 104 at
[C.s.].
144 L.G., ibid. at para.
94.

for a finding of "likely
v. (D.P.F.) (2001), 199
No. 5090 (Sup. Ct.) at
108 (Nfld. S.C.(T.D.))

145 Fleming, supra note 143 at 236.
146 [2001] O.J. No. 5456 paras. 53-62 (Sup. Ct.) (QL). The production order, however, excludes
records of therapy and counselling.
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among the cases that I have analyzed.
The hysterization of complainants is a far more resounding refrain
in these cases, anchoring decisions to produce and to release records. All
of these cases are extremely complex and each, on its own, could provide

the basis for detailed study of the manner in which stories of sexual
coercion are increasingly disqualified by destabilizing the psychological
coherence of the complainant. Here, some general, albeit striking themes
emerge. In five of the nine cases in which the production and sometimes
disclosure of all or most records was ordered, the rationale was that the
complainant[s] suffered from "false memory syndrome" (FMS). 47 (The
rationale, where elaborated,1t4 for production and disclosure in the other49
cases included: a finding of no reasonable expectation of privacy,
inconsistent statements, 50 and the ability of a developmentally disabled
complainant to perceive and recall events.) 151 In this manner, a syndromized
category, forged initially by parents claiming they had been "falsely"
accused of abuse, 52 and without status as a recognized psychological
disorder 53 gains legal legitimation within sexual assault law.

In some of these cases, even the "typical" characteristics associated
with FMS (long-forgotten memories, the recovery of memories, and
"memory-shaping" therapeutic techniques) are notably absent. R. v. R.B.,
for example, concerned an adult woman's allegations of contemporary
sexual assault against her ex-spouse.' 54 Defence counsel used statements
147 C.S., supra note 143; L.G., supra note 143; R v. G.P.J. (2001), 153 Man. R. (2d)
191 (C.A.);
X. v. R.B., [2002] N.J. No. 176 (N.L.S.C.(T.D.)) (QL) [RB.]; W.G., supra note 103.
148 In one very brief and conclusory set of reasons, no rationale for disclosure was even discussed.
See R v. W.C., [1999] M.J. No. 542 (Q.B.) (QL).
1 49
KA.G., supra note 128.
15 0

L.P.M., supra note 103.
R v. D.H., [2000] A.J. No. 142 (Prov. Ct. (Youth Div.))
(QL).
152As Susan Vella notes, "F.M.S. is a phrase which has been coined by a private American nonprofit organization called The False Memory Syndrome Foundation .... F.M.S. purports to describe a
condition whereby a patient (usually female) has been influenced, through suggestions made by her
therapist, into genuinely believing she was the victim of historical childhood sexual abuse when the
alleged sexual abuse never in fact occurred ... . This Foundation primarily consists of parents who have
been accused of sexual assault by their children and includes a small number of women who have
recanted their allegations of sexual assault against their parents. It also has an advisory board consisting
of academic researchers in the field of memory": Susan M. Vella, "Recovered Traumatic Memory in
Historical Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases: Credibility on Trial" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 91 at 92 and
n. 5.
153 "[F.M.S.] has yet to be recognized by the American Psychiatric Association as a medical
disorder, much less a "syndrome" which connotes a widespread phenomenon," ibid. at 93.
RB., supra note 147.
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made at the preliminary inquiry-where the complainant admitted to
flashbacks of childhood abuse, being on antidepressants, and undergoing
counselling both before and after laying the complaint-as the basis for a
theory of FMS and the foundation for access to counselling records. To
bolster this claim, defence counsel submitted an expert opinion claiming
that "any time therapy is involved in a case in which memory is the only
evidence (as I believe it is in the above matter), it is crucial that the
therapeutic notes from counselling sessions be examined...

." '

Clearly

influenced by this sweeping claim, the trial judge ordered production of all
therapeutic records both because counselling had occurred before the
complaint was laid and because "[t]he complainant's recall of events is
clearly an issue at trial and a review of the procedures followed concerning
her memory and the techniques probed, may well be relevant and
probative."' 6 This order was made despite the fact that there was no
evidence that the allegation was based on recovered memories. In fact, the
preliminary record shows the complainant emphatically denying this
assertion:
Well when you got thefellow you 've been going out with and thefather ofyour two kids for fifteen
years on you, assaultingyou andyou're having a flashback of yourfatherputting a gun to your
mother'shead, yes, I think I can separate the difference . "7

Strong, clear words of denial, however, seem inadequate to resist
the hysterization and syndromization of complainants that pervades cases
on production and disclosure. A vulnerability to syndromization may be
particularly acute when a complainant's life history, as in R.B., appears
marked by many incidents of sexualized violence. There is a second, closely
related theme in these cases: the untempered judicial hostility to social,
political, and feminist understandings of coercive sexuality. Where
complainants' narratives challenge a liberal, legalistic, and rigidly
individualized construction of rape, they may be most vulnerable to
disclosure and to the ultimate disqualification of their claims. This is
apparent in cases like R.B., where the pervasiveness of sexualized coercion
in the complainant's own life renders her crazy and unstable, the very
antithesis of the rational legal subject. Judicial hostility to social and
political analyses of sexualized coercion is also revealed in cases where
complainants acknowledge a reinterpretation of their past in light of new
155 Ibid. at para. 23.
156 Ibid. at para. 29. See also paras. 27, 28, 30, 34.
157 Ibid. at para. 21.
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knowledge about the pervasiveness of rape and its devastating
consequences. In W.G., for example, an adult male complainant laid a
charge of historical sexual abuse after reading the report of an inquiry into
sexual abuse by clergy members that, in his words, "made him aware of the
' This admission provides the crucial
severity of child sexual abuse."158
element in a theory of false memory, leading to the disclosure of several
years of counselling records. 59
In G.P.J., the view of feminist therapy as inherently suspect
underpins an appellate decision upholding an acquittal and an order for
production and disclosure to the accused of some twelve years of therapy
records that were the basis of the Crown's appeal. 60 In this case, the
complainant alleged repeated rape by her brother-in-law, beginning when
she was eleven and lasting for ten years. In the decision, the possibility of
memory manipulation is raised repeatedly, owing to the complainant's
testimony that she "was getting more memory ... [o]f things that

happened."1 '' It is not simply coincidental that the agency where she
received therapy was a feminist agency that counselled women. 62
Statements made by the complainant during trial influenced by feminist
understandings of sexual violence were used to support the order for
production and disclosure and, in the end, destroy her credibility. She had,
for example, made the mistake of using terms like "victimized;"'' 63 she had
talked about it being a "natural thing" for sexual abuse victims to see
themselves as being in love with their abusers; and she had testified that she
learned this from other sexual abuse victims.' 64 Feminist therapy is
constructed here as being intrinsically manipulative and justifying defence
counsel's access to confidential records. Relying on the fact that the
complainant alleged repeated rape, yet had never become pregnant,165 the
appeal judge contended that credibility was at issue because "of the
troubling and sometimes bizarre tale of sexual abuse by the accused that
she related. It was a story that at times challenged believability.1 66
158 W.G., supra note 103 at para. 8.
15 9 Ibid. at paras. 11-21.
16 0

G.P.J., supra note 147.

161 Ibid.
at 200.

162 Ibid. at 199.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.

166 Ibid. at 198.
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The "unbelievability" of this story, at least in part, seems to lie in its
gestures to a systemic and feminist understanding of sexualized coercion.
Legal hostility to the claim that sexualized violence is systemic and to the
insistence that this understanding should influence decisions on access to
complainants' records is also apparent in the undisguised hostility of some
judges to the legislative framework imposed by section 278. As argued
above, in cases where records are found not likely relevant, it is almost
exclusively on a narrow understanding of privacy rights, with little
recognition of the broader social consequences of this practice. In cases
where records are found likely relevant, not only is the analysis of "equality
rights," "discriminatory myths," consequences for "reporting," and access
to "counselling" largely ignored, it is sometimes actively resisted. According
to the R.B. decision, for example,
counselling services certainly should continue to encourage people who are suffering from
abuse to continue to be counselled. In the large scale of the criminal justice system one

cannot remove the right to make full answer and defence because some victims may not avail
of counselling. This isonly one factor which a judge should consider in a review under section
278.1.167

Similarly, in G.P.J., the trial judge dismissed the need for any
consideration of "society's interest in reporting" in the following terms: "...
the mere possibility of production of counselling records may have an
impact on complainants in cases involving sexual offences, but that has not
seemed to have affected them, considering the number of such offences
that we are presently dealing with in the court on a day-to-day basis. ' 68
Here, facilitated through an inviolable interpretation of fair trial rights, the
legislative scheme regulating access to complainants' records is rendered
virtually meaningless.
VIII. CROSS-EXAMINATION AT THE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY:
SUBVERTING THE PROTECTIONS OF SECTION 278
As I have suggested, the post-Mills terrain is highly unstable.
Contradictory interpretations of section 278 mark the case law, drawn from
and legitimized by the ambiguities in the decision itself. There is very strong
support for the claim that complainants remain vulnerable to defence
records applications and to the hysterization on which this practice is based.
And, ironically, it may be that the most encouraging aspect of recent case
167 RB., supra note 147 at para. 33.
168 G.P.J., supra note 147 at 197.
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law has generated a new defence strategy that holds the potential to
undermine the protections offered by section 278.
Given judicial endorsement of the necessity of an evidentiary
foundation for a finding of likely relevance, defence counsel, always adept
at finding ways around legislative protections for complainants, have
initiated a reinvented strategy. This strategy rests on grilling complainants
on their records at the preliminary inquiry and it has become a crucial new
battleground in the quest for disclosure. An article in the Criminal Lawyers
Association newsletter, appearing shortly after the release of the Mills
decision, counselled defence lawyers to rigorously cross-examine
complainants during the preliminary inquiry as a mechanism for building
the evidentiary basis for a finding of likely relevance. 69 The Mills decision
itself is cited as the legal basis for such a tactic because the majority had
emphasized the questioning of complainants and other Crown witnesses at
the preliminary inquiry as one means of constructing a case-specific
evidentiary foundation. 7 ' The article also relies on commentaries in cases
where records were not disclosed, admonishing defence counsel for not
engaging in cross-examination on records. Judicial endorsement of
preliminary cross-examination on records was also apparent in the postMills cases examined for this article. In M.(D.), for example, a decision
denying production of a diary on the basis of a lack of case-specific
evidence, the trial judge remarked critically, "no attempt was made [during
preliminary cross-examination] to discover the timing of relevant entries,
the degree of writing i.e. pages of narrative or summary reference only, or
the nature of entries i.e. detailed history of abuse or recordings of feelings
or emotions."''
When complainants are forced to answer intrusive questions about
their records at the preliminary inquiry, the protections afforded by section
278 are seriously eroded. While complainants are not compellable at a
section 278 hearing (which is a private hearing), they are compellable at the
preliminary inquiry as the Crown's principal witness (which is a public
hearing). There have been two significant appellate decisions establishing
the ability to cross-examine on confidential records at the preliminary
inquiry, based upon the presumed requirements of full answer and defence:
R. v. Kasook,'72 involving counselling records and the implication of
169 Skurka & Renzella, supra note 92.
170 Mills, supra note 12 at 744.
171 M.(D.),

supra note 112 at 94.

172 [20011 2 W.W.R. 683 (N.W.T.S.C.) [Kasook].
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memory-inducing therapy; and R. v. B. (E.), 73
' concerning an adolescent
boy's diary, which according to his testimony, contained no references to
the assault. The decisions in these cases affirm that privacy should limit the
scope of questioning. The essential boundary drawn is between existence
and nature, on the one hand, and contents, on the other.174 Complainants
can be asked about the existence and character of records, but not about
their detailed contents. In Kasook, however, permissible subjects were
judged to include some invasive lines of questioning about counselling,
including whether: the complainant had undergone counselling; records
were kept; the counselling involved memory work; and counselling had
affected the decision to report.
These cases are crucial because, in establishing the right to
preliminary cross-examination on records, they potentially increase
successful defence applications. In a cruel twist, it is the complainant who
will furnish the evidentiary basis for these applications. Cross-examination
at preliminary hearings can also induce complainants to withdraw
complaints, to refuse to testify, or not to report in the first place. A 1998
survey of sexual assault survivors revealed that concern over the possibility
of record disclosure was a major reason for not reporting: "women said that
they were unwilling to risk being re-victimized by 'being put under a
microscope during the trial'... .,175 This potential still exists and is given

new life in the post-Mills context through the legal prioritization of fair trial
rights in section 278 applications and the defence emphasis on preliminary
cross-examination as a central means of establishing the basis for these
applications.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Against the much repeated claim that a contextualized, equalitysensitive framework for adjudicating sexual assault is finally emerging in
Canadian law, this analysis of access to complainants' records suggests a
less sanguine conclusion. Emerging out of the tensions inscribed within
Mills, recent decisions continue to privilege the legal rights of the accused
and to reinforce a liberal legalistic construction of sexual violence. Policy
making and legal reform in this area are subordinated to the presumed
requisites of the Charter, while recognition of the systemic nature and
complexities of sexual violence has been actively resisted in legal decision
173 R v. B.(E.) (2002), 570 O.R. (3d) 741 (C.A.).
174 Kasook, supra note 172 at 695; B. (E.), ibid. at
745-46.
175 Hattem, supra note 46
at 9.
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making. Paradoxically, the image of progress may have the effect of locating
the problem of coercive sexuality more firmly within the terrain of criminal
law, legitimizing a narrow conception of rape as a discrete and isolated
event.
As I have suggested, privacy, conceived as the right to contain
narratives of sexualized violence within a bounded personal space, provides
tenuous protection against vigorous pursuit of records by defence counsel.
When complainants can be constructed as failing to enact the new
characteristics of ideal victimhood, their entitlement to privacy is
discounted. When the psychological coherence and rigid individualism of
ideal victimhood cannot be performed, the invasion of privacy knows no
bounds, extending to an interrogation not only of what has been said, but
also of what has not been said. In fact it seems that in records application
cases, complainants are inevitably called upon to resist their own
syndromization; this becomes a cruel prerequisite for seeking legal redress.
But there is another peril of privacy that is suggested by this analysis
of access to complainants' records-the peril of depoliticization. The threat
of disclosure of confidential records works to inhibit social and legal
recognition of sexualized violence by constructing the private as the only
legitimate realm for reflection. Feminists did break the silence around
sexualized violence in the last part of the twentieth century; yet we could
characterize the current period as one where a new silence is being reestablished. One mechanism for enforcing silence is judicially sanctioned
access to records. Underlying the probing of complainants' records is the
message that we need to be very careful of what we say about sexual assault.
Discourses about sexual violence, once breaking into public discourse, are
increasingly reprivatized.
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Appendix A: Post-Mills Cases Analyzed (37)
R. v. B. (E.) (2002), 570 O.R. (3d) 741 (C.A.).
R. v. Batte, [2000] 49 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.).
R. v. C.S. (2000), 195 Nfld. & P.E.I.R 219 (Nfld. S.C.(T.D.)).
R. v. D.H., [2000] 142 A.J. (Prov. Ct. (Youth Div.)) (QL).
R. v. D.M., [2000] O.J. No. 3114 (Sup. Ct) (QL).
R. v. D.P.F.(2000), 194 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 51 (Nfld. S.C.(T.D.)).
R. v. D.WL., [2001] N.S.J. No. 269 (C.A.) (QL).
R. v. E.A.N., [20001 B.C.J. No. 298 (C.A.) (QL).
R. v. G.P.J.(2001), 153 Man. R. (2d) 191 (C.A.).
R. v. Hammond, [2002] O.J. No. 1596 (Ct. J.) (QL).
R. v. Howorka, [2002] A.J. No. 665 (C.A.) (QL).
R. v. Hudson, [2001] O.J. No. 5456 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. KA.G. (2001), 192 N.S.R. (2d) 5 (Fain. Ct.).
R. v. Kasook, [2001] 2 W.W.R. 683 (N.W.T. S.C.).
R. v. L.G., [2000] O.J. No. 5090 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. L.P.M., [2000] O.J. No. 4076 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. L.S., [2000] O.J. No. 3991 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. Lalo, [2002] N.S.J. No. 342 (S.C.) (QL).
R. v. M.A.S., [2001] M.J. No. 516 (Q.13.) (QL).
R. v. M.G., [2001] M.J. No. 61 (Prov. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. N.P., [2001] O.J. No. 1828 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. P.E., [2000] O.J. No. 574 (C.A.) (QL).
R. v. P.J.S., [2000] Y.J. No. 119 (S.C.) (QL).
R. v. Peny, [2000] O.J. No. 2112 (C.A.) (QL).
R. v. R.B., [2002] N.J. No. 176 (S.C.(T.D.)) (QL).
R. v. R.C., [2002] O.J. No. 865 (C.A.) (QL).
R. v. S.P., [2001] O.J. No. 2898 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. Shearing (2002), 214 D.L.R. (4 th) 215 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Stewart, [2000] B.C.J. No. 1815 (C.A.) (QL).
R. v. Sutherland, [2001] 156 C.C.C. (3d) 264 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Tatchell, [2001] 207 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 131 (S.C.(T.D.)).
R. v. Thompson, [2001] 52 O.R. (3d) 779 (C.A.).
R. v. WC., [1999] M.J. No. 542 (Q.B.) (QL).
R. v. WG., [2000] N.J. No. 86 (S.C.(T.D.)) (QL).
R. v. WP.N., [2000] N.W.T.J. No. 15 (S.C.) (QL).
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Likely Relevance (27)
Decisions in Which Records Were Found Likely Relevant (9):
R. v. C.S. (2000), 195 Nfld. & P.E.I.R 219 (Nfld. S.C.(T.D.)).
R. v. D.H., [2000] A.J. No. 142 (Prov. Ct. (Youth Div.)) (QL).
R. v. G.P.J. (2001), 153 Man. R. (2d) 191 (C.A.).
R. v. KA.G. (2001), 192 N.S.R. (2d) 5 (Fain. Ct).
R. v. L.G., [2000] O.J. No. 5090 (Sup.Ct.) (QL).
**R. v. L.P.M, [2000] O.J. No. 4076 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. R.B., [2002] N.J. No. 176 (S.C.(T.D.)) (QL).
**R. v. WC., [1999] M.J. No. 542 (Q.B.) (QL).
**R. v. W.G., [2000] N.J. No. 86 (S.C.(T.D.)) (QL).
Decisions in Which Some Records Found Likely Relevant (4):
R. v. D.P.F.,(2000), 194 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 51 (Nfld. S.C.(T.D.)).
R. v. Hudson, [2001] O.J. No. 5456 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. L.S., [2000] O.J. No. 3991 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
*R. v. WP.N., [2000] N.W.T.J. No. 15 (S.C.) (QL).
Decisions in Which Records Were Found Not Likely Relevant (14):
R. v. Batte, [2000] 49 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.).
R. v. D.M, [2000] O.J. No. 3114 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. D.WL., [2001] N.S.J. No. 269 (C.A.) (QL).
R. v. E.A.N., [2000] B.C.J. No. 298 (C.A.) (QL).
R. v. MA.S., [2001] M.J. No. 516 (Q.B.) (QL).
R. v. MG., [2001] M.J. No. 61 (Prov. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. N.P., [2001] O.J. No. 1828 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. P.E., [2000] O.J. No. 574 (C.A.) (QL).
R. v. P.J.S., [2000] Y.J. No. 119 (S.C.) (QL).
R. v. R.C., [2002] O.J. No. 865 (C.A.) (QL).
R. v. S.P., [2001] O.J. No. 2898 (Sup. Ct.) (QL).
R. v. Sutherland, [2001] 156 C.C.C. (3d) 264 (Ont. C.A.).
R. v. Tatchell, [2001] 207 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 131 (Nfld. S.C.(T.D.)).
R. v. Thompson, [2001] 52 O.R. (3d) 779 (C.A.).
*indicates disclosure decision, not disclosed
**indicates disclosure decision, records or portion of records
disclosed

